Blood, Brains, and Bludgeoning, But NOT Breasts:  An Analysis and Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association by Jennings, Margaret E.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-2011
Blood, Brains, and Bludgeoning, But NOT Breasts:
An Analysis and Critique of Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association
Margaret E. Jennings
Loyola Law School Los Angeles
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret E. Jennings, Blood, Brains, and Bludgeoning, But NOT Breasts: An Analysis and Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants





BLOOD, BRAINS, AND BLUDGEONING,  
BUT NOT BREASTS:  AN ANALYSIS AND 
CRITIQUE OF BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT 
MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION 
Margaret E. Jennings* 
 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court held 
that a California statute banning the sale of extremely violent video games 
to minors was unconstitutional because it violated minors’ First Amend-
ment rights.  This decision highlights the Court’s inconsistent application 
of evidentiary standards required for States to regulate the sale of erotic 
(not obscene) content and the sale of violent content to children.   
 In Brown, the Court stated that unless California could prove a causal 
link between violent video games and harmful effects on children, it could 
not regulate the sale of even the most violent of games.  However, this 
holding contradicts Ginsberg v. New York, where the Court did not require 
the State to proffer any evidence that erotic material was harmful to minors 
and ruled that the Constitution did not prevent the State from regulating the 
sale of “girlie” magazines to them.  
 Additionally, Brown represents a departure from the Court’s standing 
precedents since it has never before allowed a vendor to assert the constitu-
tional rights of children.  In fact, the statute in Brown permitted parents to 
purchase any violent games for their children.  Therefore, the Court al-
lowed the vendor to assert this alleged right even contrary to the rights of 
parents.  The Court ignored the deeply entrenched right of parents to direct 
the upbringing of their children, and instead recognized a minor’s right to 
circumvent parental authority.  The overall result, as Justice Breyer stated 
in his dissent, is that Brown has created “a serious anomaly in First 
Amendment law.” 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., University of Iowa, 2008.  The author would 
like to thank her family and friends for their support throughout the production of this article.  
She would also like to thank Loyola Law School professor Karl Manheim for his encouragement 
and invaluable expertise.  Finally, the author would especially like to thank the Editorial Board 
and the rest of the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for 
their efforts in making this publication possible. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Ever since a first-person shooter video game allegedly inspired Eric 
Harris and Dylan Klebold to kill their classmates at Columbine High 
School in 1999,1 legislatures across the country have tried to regulate the 
sale of violent video games to minors.2  In response, the video game indus-
try hastily challenged these statutes.3  In each challenge, the statutes failed 
for being unconstitutionally vague in defining “violence” or for failing to 
demonstrate that the government’s interest was sufficiently compelling to 
withstand strict judicial review.4  Nevertheless, without a ruling from the 
Supreme Court, lawmakers continued in these efforts with wide bipartisan 
support, and the video game industry continued to challenge the laws.5 
 Finally, in April 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a 
challenge to California’s violent video game statute in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.6  There, the Ninth Circuit declared uncon-
 
1. See Killer’s Journal Shows Detailed Plan of Massacre, HARLAN DAILY ENTER., Dec. 6, 
2001, at 2 (quoting Eric Harris’s journal as stating, “[i]t’ll be like the LA riots, the Oklahoma 
bombing, WWII, Vietnam, Duke and Doom all mixed together. . . .  I want to leave a lasting im-
pression on the world.”).  “Duke” and “Doom” are references to the video games Duke Nukem 
and Doom; in both games the objective is to kill enemies to earn points.  Duke Nukem, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duke_Nukem (last visited Mar. 2, 2011); Doom, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doom_(video_game) (last visited Mar. 2, 2011); see 
also Paul Duggan, Michael D. Sear, & Marc Fisher, Shooter Pair Mixed Fantasy, Reality, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 22, 1999, at A1 (detailing Harris and Klebold’s obsession with fantasy violence).  But 
see Greg Toppo, 10 Years Later, the Real Story Behind Columbine; Long-Held Views of the At-
tack and the Killers Prove Wrong, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2009, at A1 (stating investigation re-
vealed attack attributable to boys’ mental illness rather than fantasy violence obsession). 
2. See generally Jeffrey O’Holleran, Note, Blood Code:  The History and Future of Video 
Game Censorship, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 571, 572 (2010); see also Legislation 
Tracker, GAMEPOLITICS.COM, http://www.gamepolitics.com/legislation.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 
2012) [hereinafter Legislation Tracker]. 
3. See Seth Schiesel, Courts Block Laws on Video Game Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2007, at E1; see also Legislation Tracker, supra note 2. 
4. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006); Entm’t 
Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. 
St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 
244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blago-
jevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 
2d 978 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004). 
5. See Lorraine M. Buerger, Comment, The Safe Games Illinois Act:  Can Curbs on Violent 
Video Games Survive Constitutional Challenges?, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 617, 663 (2006); Legisla-
tion Tracker, supra note 2. 
6. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
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stitutional a California statute banning the sale of certain violent video 
games to minors.7  The Supreme Court’s heavily anticipated hearing of “the 
single most important court case in gaming history,”8 prompted the filing of 
nearly thirty amicus briefs, almost all in support of the video game indus-
try.9  The Entertainment Consumers Association staged a rally outside the 
courthouse on the day of oral arguments,10 and even comedian Jon Stewart 
added his sardonic voice to the debate on his program, The Daily Show.11 
 After a decade of legal challenges to legislative efforts to restrict the 
sale of violent video games to children,12 the Supreme Court ruled on June 
27, 2011 that the California law was unconstitutional because violent video 
games fall within the purview of First Amendment protection for minors.13  
The gaming blogosphere hailed the decision as “the best possible outcome, 
both for the game industry and for the public at large . . . .”14 
 This article will analyze the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. En-
tertainment Merchants Ass’n.  Part II will provide a general overview of 
First Amendment law.  Part III will briefly describe the background of the 
California statute and the subsequent procedural history leading up to the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.  Part IV will summarize the Court’s 
ruling, the concurring opinion of Justice Alito, and the dissenting opinions 
of Justices Thomas and Breyer.  Part V will analyze the reasoning behind 
the various opinions and find that Justice Breyer is the only member of the 
Court to properly apply case precedent and to correctly conclude the statute 
 
7. Id. 
8. Daniel Horowitz, Supreme Court to Hear Schwarzenegger v. EMA; Single Most Impor-
tant Case in Gaming History, WORLD GAMING NETWORK (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.world-
gaming.com/component/content/article/6-general/1111-supreme-court-to-hear-schwarzenegger-v-
ema-single-most-important-court-case-in-gaming-history.html. 
9. See Docket of Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, No. 08-1448, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-1448.htm. 
10. Richard Mitchell, ECA to Stage Washington Rally Prior to Supreme Court Battle, 
JOYSTIQ (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.joystiq.com/2010/10/14/eca-to-stage-washington-rally-
prior-to-supreme-court-battle/. 
11. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-november-4-2010/you-re-welcome---
violent-video-games.   
12. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 572 (recognizing video games as a protected 
form of expression for the first time in the federal courts); see also Kurtis A. Kemper, Annota-
tion, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Commercial and Home Video Games, 106 A.L.R. 
5th 337 (2003) (providing a historical overview of legal challenges to video game regulations). 
13. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729.  
14. Mark Methenitis, LGJ:  On Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., JOYSTIQ (Jan. 12, 
2012, 4:47 PM), http://www.joystiq.com/2011/07/04/lgj-on-brown-v-entertainment-merchants-
assn/.  
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is constitutional.  Part VI will address the Court’s glaring omission:  the 
Entertainment Merchants Association’s lack of standing to assert the right 
at issue.  Finally, Part VII will conclude that given the narrow 5-4 division 
of the Court on the ultimate issue in the case and the emerging social scien-
tific research supporting a causative relationship between violent video 
games and negative cognitive and behavioral effects on children, a future 
challenge to a more narrowly crafted statute may earn the support of a ma-
jority of the Court. 
 A philosophical inquiry into problems that may be posed for society if 
children are desensitized to violence or exposed to erotica is beyond the 
scope of this article.  Instead, the focus of this article is solely on the 
Court’s inconsistent application of case precedent to minors’ First Amend-
ment rights, which, as Justice Breyer aptly indicated, has created a trou-
bling “anomaly in First Amendment Law.”15 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND 
A.  General First Amendment Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment proclaims that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”16  At the core of the Amendment is 
the understanding that “each person should decide for himself or herself the 
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”17  
Despite its seemingly specific wording, First Amendment protection ex-
tends beyond mere “speech,” and in American Amusement Machine Ass’n 
v. Kendrick, the Seventh Circuit recognized video games as a form of pro-
tected expression under the First Amendment.18 
Since the First Amendment was incorporated in 1925,19 and thereby 
made applicable to state governments, case law has developed to provide 
different degrees of protection for different types of speech.20  The Court 
has stated that the Amendment’s protection is not absolute and does not 
 
15. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
17. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641(1994) [hereinafter Turner]. 
18. Bonnie B. Phillips, Note, Virtual Violence or Virtual Apprenticeship:  Justification for 
the Recognition of a Violent Video Game Exception to the Scope of the First Amendment Rights 
of Minors, 36 IND. L. REV. 1385, 1388–89 (2003). 
19. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
20. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.1 at 
986 (3d ed. 2006). 
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include libelous speech or obscenity.21  In reviewing legislative infringe-
ments upon the First Amendment, the Court will apply different levels of 
scrutiny to laws that are “content-based” and laws that are “content neu-
tral.”22  “Content-based” laws, those regulating the content of speech, are 
presumptively invalid because they present a risk that the government will 
extract entire viewpoints from the public dialogue, effectively imposing a 
government prescribed orthodoxy.23  Courts review “content-based” restric-
tions using strict scrutiny, which requires the government to use the least 
restrictive means possible to further a compelling government interest.24  
Laws that are “content neutral” pose a lesser risk of removing ideas or 
viewpoints from public discourse.25  Accordingly, those laws are reviewed 
under the less stringent standard of intermediate scrutiny.  A “content-
neutral” law must be narrowly tailored to further a substantial government 
interest.26  The law must “burden no more speech than necessary” in order 
to further the government interest.27 
In determining whether or not a particular speech restriction is consti-
tutional, courts will also look to see if the law is vague, because vague laws 
may deny due process.28  For example, a law is unconstitutionally vague if 
a reasonable person is unable to decipher which speech is prohibited and 
which speech is permitted; as a result, he or she would be unable to comply 
with the law and it would be unconstitutionally vague.29 
 
21. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). 
22. See, e.g., Turner, 512 U.S. 622.  In Turner, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
“must-carry” provisions in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 (“CPCA”).  Id.  The CPCA was enacted by Congress to address a concern that “a competi-
tive imbalance between cable television and over-the-air broadcasters was endangering the broad-
casters’ ability to compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues.”  Id. 
at 622.  The Court held that despite the content neutrality of the provisions at issue, the govern-
ment needed to provide stronger factual support for their economic necessity.  Id. 
23. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Street Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (stating content-based restrictions “[r]aise the specter that the government 
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”); Turner, 512 U.S. at 641 
(“Government action that stifles speech on account of its message . . . contravenes this essential 
[First Amendment] right.”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 530, 538 (1980) (“To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public de-
bate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth.”). 
24. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
25. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. 
26. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
27. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).  
28. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
29. See, e.g., id. (finding a law is fatally vague when someone “of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning”). 
 
92 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:87 
 
B.  Categorical Exclusion for Obscenity 
The First Amendment establishes a default rule that all speech is fully 
protected.30  However, on a case-by-case basis, the Court has created a list 
of types of speech that are categorically excluded from First Amendment 
protection.31  The existing categories of unprotected speech are obscenity,32 
incitement of illegal activity,33 and fighting words.34  The Court has also 
reduced the level of protection afforded to other categories of speech, in-
cluding commercial speech and some sexually oriented speech that falls 
short of obscenity, holding that these types of speech are of “low value.”35  
Statutes proscribing these forms of speech are reviewed using rational ba-
sis—the most deferential of all forms of judicial review.36  Some scholars 
believe that these exclusions reflect the Court’s own value judgments when 
it balances the State’s proffered justifications for regulating certain speech 
with the Court’s view of the value of that speech to society.37  In United 
States v. Stevens, the Court stated that it would no longer add new catego-
ries of speech to the list of those that are not protected under the First 
Amendment.38  The respondent in Stevens was indicted for selling dog-
fighting videos under a federal statute that criminalized “the commercial 
creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty.”39  Leg-
islative history reveals that Congress was primarily concerned with pro-
scribing the proliferation of “crush videos” (sexual fetish videos that fea-
ture “the intentional torture and killing of helpless animals”), although 
dogfighting videos also falls under the statutory definition.40  In invalidat-
ing the statute, the Court rejected the government’s argument that the de-
 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Roth, 354 U.S. at 483; 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
32. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.  
33. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49.  
34. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.   
35. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771–72 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional a state law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising 
the prices of prescription drugs).  Compare Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–
71 (1976) with City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54–55 (1986) (both cases 
upholding zoning ordinances applicable to adult movie theaters); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 765–66 (1982) (holding that the government may ban the exhibition, sale, or distribution of 
child pornography even if it does not meet the statutory definition of obscenity).    
36. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 540.   
37. Id. at 987.   
38. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010). 
39. Id. at 1579. 
40. Id. (citations omitted).  
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pictions at issue were of such low social value that they should be added as 
a category of unprotected speech.41  The majority reasoned that protections 
of the First Amendment are not limited exclusively to speech that survives 
an “ad hoc balancing” of the costs and benefits of such speech to society, 
but instead, encompass all expression except that which has historically 
been unprotected.42   In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
First Amendment protection does not extend to obscenity because such 
speech is “utterly without redeeming social importance.”43  Following 
Roth, the Court struggled to define what kind of expressive material was 
obscene.44  Accordingly, the Court’s definition of obscenity evolved 
through a number of cases.45  Finally, in 1957, in Miller v. California,46 the 
Court formulated the basic test for obscenity that is still used today.47  
Miller holds that expressive material will be deemed “obscene” if 
(a) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest; (b) . . . the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.48 
C.  First Amendment Rights of Children 
 The Court has also found that some erotic speech that does not meet 
the Miller test may still be outside the realm of Constitutional protection 
 
41. See id. at 1585–86.   
42. Id. at 1585. 
43. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
44. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall 
not today attempt to further define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it 
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).  
45. See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (defining obscene material as that “which deals with sex 
in a manner appealing to prurient interest”); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman 
of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) [hereinafter Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts] (overruling Roth and finding material to be obscene when “(a) the dominant theme of the 
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive 
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation 
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value”). 
46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).   
47. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 1020–21; see, e.g., United States v. Little, No. 08-
15964 (11th Cir. 2010), available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/unpub/ops/200815964.pdf.  
48. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citations omitted). 
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for children.49  In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court reviewed a state statute 
that restricted the sale of “girlie” magazines to minors.50  In order to pro-
hibit the sale to minors of the content that was not prohibited for adults, the 
New York legislature modified the prevailing obscenity test for adults by 
restricting only pornographic material that would be “harmful to minors.”51  
The statute defined material harmful to minors as 
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic 
abuse, when it: 
(i)  predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful, or morbid 
interest of minors, and 
(ii)  is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material 
for minors, and 
(iii)  is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.52 
 Even though the “girlie” magazines were constitutionally protected 
speech for adults,53 the Supreme Court held the same material was not pro-
tected for children.54  Thus, the Court reviewed New York’s “variable ob-
scenity statute” by applying the same standard used for other statutes re-
stricting unprotected speech—rational basis.55  Justice Brennan, writing for 
the majority, articulated two justifications for limiting minors’ access to sex-
based content.56  First, he said that the Constitution recognizes a parent’s 
fundamental right to direct the upbringing of his or her child, and as a result, 
the legislature is reasonable in enacting laws that support a parent’s fulfill-
 
49. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (holding that a 
student’s public speech containing “sexual innuendos,” albeit not obscene, was not protected by 
the First Amendment in a public school setting because of a “concern on the part of parents, and 
school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children . . . from exposure to sexually ex-
plicit, indecent, or lewd speech”).    
50. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631–32 (1968) (involving magazines contain-
ing pictures depicting female ‘nudity’ showing “buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or 
the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof 
below the top of the nipple.”).   
51. Id. at 643 (modifying the obscenity statute articulated by the Court in Memoirs v. Mas-
sachusetts, 383 U.S. 413).  
52. Id. at 646.   
53. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 636 (1979) (describing the magazines at issue in 
Ginsberg as “clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice [for adults]”).  
54. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629.  
55. See id. at 641 (the Court required only that “it was not irrational for the legislature to 
find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”).  
56. See id. at 639. 
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ment of that responsibility.57  Second, Justice Brennan said that the State has 
an “independent interest in the well being of its youth.”  He argued, “while 
the supervision of children’s reading may best be left to their parents, the 
knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and 
society’s transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify 
reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them.”58 
 Subsequent cases interpreting Ginsberg clarified and reaffirmed the 
interests articulated by Justice Brennan.  In First Amendment challenges to 
broadcasting and Internet regulations, the Court has held that the state’s in-
terest in protecting children was a “compelling interest,” meaning regula-
tions in furtherance of that interest might survive strict judicial review.59  In 
Belotti v. Baird, the Court declared, “the State is entitled to adjust its legal 
system to account for children’s vulnerability.”60  The Court affirmed that 
as part of our constitutional commitment to “individual liberty and freedom 
of choice,” the directing and upbringing of children rests first with the 
child’s parents.61 
 Finally, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld FCC regu-
lations prohibiting indecent speech (not obscene speech) over television 
and radio broadcasts.62  The Court justified this First Amendment intrusion 
by saying, “[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast 
material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify 
special treatment of indecent broadcasting.”63  Collectively, these cases 
recognize that a child’s right to access speech without parental consent is 
not coextensive with an adult’s right to access the same material.64 
 
57. Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972).  
58. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640. 
59. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. at 126 (“We have recognized that there is a 
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well being of minors.  This inter-
est extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult stan-
dards.”) (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639–40; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–57; Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 869 (1997)).   
60. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635–39 (challenging a state statute regulating minors’ access to 
abortions and holding that “[l]egal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the pa-
rental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that make 
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding”).  
61. Id. at 638. 
62. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750–51 (1978).   
63. Id. at 750.   
64. See generally Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622; Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726. 
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III.  THE ACT, THE CHALLENGE, AND THE APPEAL 
A.  California Civil Code Sections 1746–1746.5:   
Background and Legislative History 
 Before 2005, the video game industry, like the film and recording in-
dustries, enjoyed the freedom of voluntary regulation via its own Enter-
tainment Software Rating Board (“ESRB”).65 According to its website, the 
ESRB is “a non-profit, self-regulatory body . . . [that] assigns computer and 
video game content ratings, enforces industry-adopted advertising guide-
lines, and helps ensure responsible online privacy practices for the interac-
tive entertainment software industry.”66  However, the ESRB may have an 
economic incentive to rate games with a lower label than their content may 
merit because it receives funding from the video game industry, and the in-
dustry sells more games with low ratings than with adults-only ratings.67  
While the ESRB “encourages” game retailers to display information about 
its rating system, and to “refrain from renting or selling adults-only games 
to minors” without parental consent, children can and do purchase adults-
only rated video games.68 
 Dissatisfied with the gap in the ESRB’s enforcement of its rating sys-
tem, the California legislature decided to intervene.69  In 2005, the lawmak-
 
65. About ESRB, ESRB.ORG, http://www.esrb.org/about/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 20, 
2012) [hereinafter About ESRB] (stating that the ESRB has been in place since 1994).  By com-
parison, the recording industry self-regulates via the Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica’s Parental Advisory Label Program.  See Parental Advisory, RIAA.COM, 
http://www.riaa.com/toolsforparents.php?content_selector=parental_advisory (last visited Mar. 
20, 2012)). The film industry self-regulates via the Motion Picture Association of America’s 
Classification and Rating Administration.  See The Movie Rating System, FILMRATINGS.COM, 
http://www.filmratings.com/filmRatings_Cara/downloads/pdf/about/cara_about_voluntary_movie
_rating.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).  
66. About ESRB, supra note 65.  
67. FTC, A REPORT TO CONGRESS, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN:  
A FIFTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC 
RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES 19 (Apr. 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/070412MarketingViolentEChildren.pdf.    
68. Id.  A survey by the National Institute on Media and the Family found that seven out of 
ten of the 600 children surveyed reported playing M-rated games, and sixty-one percent owned an 
M-rated game.  Id. at 19 (internal citation omitted); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2740–41 (2011) (citing FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS, MARKETING VIOLENT 
ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN 30 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf (stating twenty percent of those 
under age 17 are still able to buy M-rated games)).  
69. See Peter Cohen, E3:  Calif. Bill Proposes Video Game Sales Restrictions, 
MACWORLD.COM (May 16, 2005, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.macworld.com/article/44821/2005/05/gamebill.html.  
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ers attempted to craft a statute restricting the sale of violent video games to 
children that would pass constitutional muster.70  On October 7th of that 
year, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law Assembly Bill 
1179, codified at California Civil Code sections 1746–1746.5 (“Act”).71 
 In passing the Act, the legislature made the following findings: 
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of violence in video games, 
including sexual and heinous violence, makes those minors more 
likely to experience feelings of aggression, to experience a re-
duction of activity in the frontal lobes of the brain, and to exhibit 
violent antisocial or aggressive behavior. 
(b) Even minors who do not commit acts of violence suffer psy-
chological harm from prolonged exposure to violent video games. 
(c) The state has a compelling interest in preventing violent, ag-
gressive, and antisocial behavior, and in preventing psychological 
or neurological harm to minors who play violent video games.72 
 The Act prohibited the sale or rental of video games to minors that 
were “violent.”73  The Act defined a “violent video game” as: 
(d)(1) . . . a video game in which the range of options available 
to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually 
assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted 
in the game in a manner that does either of the following: 
(A)  Comes within all of the following descriptions: 
(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a 
whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid in-
terest of minors. 
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in 
the community as to what is suitable for minors. 
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious lit-
erary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury 
upon images of human beings or characters with substan-
tially human characteristics in a manner which is espe-
 
70. Id.  
71. See California’s Violent Video Game Law on Hold, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, Dec. 23, 
2005, at 5.  
72. Assemb. B. 1179 Ch. 638 (Cal. 2005).  
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1(a) (West 2011).  
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cially heinous, cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture 
or serious physical abuse to the victim.74   
If a game satisfied the statute’s definition of “violent,” the Act im-
posed the requirement that on the front face of the game’s package, there 
should “be . . . a solid white ‘18’ outlined in black . . . not less than 2 inches 
by 2 inches in size.”75  Violators of the Act, with the exception of sales 
clerks, who were exempt from liability, would be subject to a civil penalty 
of up to $1,000.76  The Act included an affirmative defense for a defendant 
who “demanded, was shown, and reasonably relied upon evidence that a 
purchaser or renter of a violent video game was not a minor or that [relied 
on a game’s label when] the manufacturer failed to label a violent video 
game as required pursuant to section 1746.2.”77  It did not restrict a minor’s 
parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or legal guardian from buying or renting 
any game on behalf of a minor.78 
 The Act’s definition of violence can be analyzed by examining each 
section.  Section (d)(1) created a threshold requirement similar to the stat-
utes in Ginsberg v. New York and Miller v. California.79  The Act limited 
the encompassed content to games where the player may kill, maim, dis-
member, or sexually assault the image of a human being.80  In addition to 
restricting the breadth of material covered by the statute, a threshold re-
quirement also serves a notice function, and in this case, was intended to 
provide video game dealers with fair notice of the types of games that 
would be proscribed by the statute.81 
 
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2011).   
75. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2009), 
aff’d sub nom. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 [hereinafter Video Software Dealers] (cit-
ing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.2 (West 2011)). 
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.3 (West 2011).  
77. CIV. § 1746.1(b). 
78. Id. § 1746.1(c). 
79. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 647 app. A (1968) (upholding a statute where the 
threshold limitations encompassed visual and literary representations and sound recordings con-
taining “nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse” harmful to minors, or  “detailed verbal 
description or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse” 
harmful to minors when taken as a whole); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (suggest-
ing a threshold limitation covering content such as “[p]atently offensive representations or de-
scription of ultimate sexual acts,” or “masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of 
the genitals”).  
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2011).   
81. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (stating that the threshold requirements in the Miller test pro-
vided fair notice to pornography dealers of what materials might warrant prosecution). 
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 Subsection (A) is a variation on the Miller obscenity test,82 as it in-
corporated the same three prongs, but was adjusted to target violence as 
opposed to obscenity.83  The Act replaced the word “prurient” from the 
Miller test84 with the words “deviant or morbid,” and also added the words 
“of minors” or “for minors” to the end of each prong.85  In subsection (B), 
the legislature attempted to bolster the strength of the statute and avoid a 
vagueness fatality by borrowing language from federal death penalty in-
structions to define key terms such as “cruel,” “depraved,” “heinous,” and 
“serious physical abuse.”86  The Act also provided factors to determine 
when a video game killing is particularly gruesome, including “infliction of 
gratuitous violence upon the victim beyond that necessary to commit the 
killing, needless mutilation of the victim’s body, and the helplessness of the 
victim.”87  However, these attempts proved futile since the State conceded 
on appeal that subsection (B) was overbroad.88 
 The Act operated in the same manner as many other state statutes that 
were enacted to protect children89—restricting only the sale or rental of 
violent games to minors.90  It did not limit minors’ use or possession of any 
video games, nor did it limit video game manufacturers’ ability to produce 
or sell any games to adults.91  As such, the Act operated in the same man-
ner as laws restricting the sale of cigarettes, guns, ammunition, and pornog-
raphy to children.92 
 
82. See id. at 24 (citations omitted) (holding that expressive material will be deemed “ob-
scene” if “(a) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) . . . the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value”). 
83. See CIV. § 1746(d)(1)(A). 
84. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (restricting the scope of the statute to works that “appeal to 
the prurient interest in sex”). 
85. CIV. § 1746(d)(1)(A).   
86. Video Software Dealers, 556 F.3d at 954. 
87. CIV. § 1746(d)(2)–(3).   
88.  See Video Software Dealers, 556 F.3d at 956. 
89. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West 2008) (prohibiting the sale or furnishing of 
tobacco or smoking paraphernalia to minors); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12280(a)(2) (West 2009) 
(prohibiting the transfer, lending, sale, or furnishing of any assault weapon to a minor); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 30300 (West 2011) (prohibiting the sale or supply of ammunition to a person un-
der 18); CAL. PENAL CODe §§ 313–313.1 (West 2008) (prohibiting the sale, rental, or distribution 
of pornography to minors). 
90. CIV. § 1746.1(a). 
91.  See id. § 1746.1(c). 
92. See, e.g., PENAL § 308 (prohibiting the sale or furnishing of tobacco or smoking para-
phernalia to minors); PENAL § 12280(a)(2) (prohibiting the transfer, lending, sale, of furnishing 
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B.  Procedural History 
 Prior to the Act’s implementation, Plaintiff-Appellees Video Software 
Dealers Association and Entertainment Software Association (collectively 
“Video Dealers”) filed suit seeking declaratory relief by alleging that the 
Act violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.93  The Video Dealers prevailed when the district court granted sum-
mary judgment in their favor, permanently enjoining enforcement of the 
Act.94  The State appealed the district court’s ruling.95 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a question of first impres-
sion when the State argued that the court should lower the standard for re-
view for a content-based law restricting the sale of violent video games to 
minors.96  Creating an analogy to Ginsberg, the State contended that the Act, 
like the statute in Ginsberg, restricted the sale to minors of speech that re-
mains protected for adults.97  The State argued that in Ginsberg, the Supreme 
Court analyzed the statute at issue using rational basis, and that the same 
level of review should be applied in Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.98 
 The Ninth Circuit rejected the State’s argument and declined to apply 
rational basis review to the Act.99  Instead, the Ninth Circuit limited Gins-
berg’s reach by finding it to be “specifically rooted in the Court’s First 
Amendment obscenity jurisprudence, which relates [only] to non-protected 
sex-based expression—not violent content . . . .”100  To the State’s disap-
pointment, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Act as it would any other content-
based restriction using strict scrutiny.101  As a result, the Ninth Circuit found 
that the State’s asserted interest, preventing “psychological or neurological 
harm to minors who play violent video games,”102 was not a compelling in-
terest.103  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit dismissed evidence 
showing any effect that violent video games may have on minors’ 
 
of any assault weapon to a minor); PENAL § 30300 (prohibiting the sale or supply of ammunition 
to a person under 18); PENAL §§ 313–313.1 (prohibiting the sale, rental or distribution of pornog-
raphy to minors).   
93. Video Software Dealers, 556 F.3d at 955. 
94. Id. at 955–56. 
95. Id. at 956. 
96. Id. at 957–58. 
97. Id. at 958 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636).  
98. Id. at 959 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641).  
99. See Video Software Dealers, 556 F.3d at 960. 
100. Id. at 959. 
101. Id. at 960. 
102. Id. at 954. 
103. Id. at 964. 
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psychological health.104  The court believed that much of the evidence was 
correlative in nature and that a direct causal link between hostile and aggres-
sive behavior in children and violent video games had not been proven.105 
 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit concluded the State had not demonstrated 
that the Act was narrowly tailored to further the State’s proposed interest 
and that the State had not shown that less restrictive means were not avail-
able.106  Instead, the State focused only on the “most effective” means of 
furthering its interest—imposing a financial penalty on retailers that vio-
lated the Act—rather than the “least restrictive” means, such as the ESRB, 
parental controls on gaming consoles, or educational campaigns.107 
IV.  BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION 
 The State of California appealed the Ninth Circuit ruling, and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.108  On the last day of its 2010–2011 term, 
the Court, in alliances inconsistent with its typical liberal-conservative di-
vision, produced a fractured opinion.109  The majority opinion, written by 
Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, found California Civil Code sections 1746–1746.5 (“Act”) uncon-
stitutional.110  The Chief Justice joined a concurring opinion written by Jus-
tice Alito that held that the Act failed on vagueness grounds.111  However, 
his opinion did not address the broader issue of whether a more narrowly 
crafted statute might pass constitutional muster.112  In separate dissents, 
Justices Breyer and Thomas upheld the Act as constitutional.113 
 
104. Id. 
105. Video Software Dealers, 556 F.3d at 963–64. 
106. Id. at 965. 
107. Id. 
108. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
109. See Frank LoMonte, When It Comes to Government Infringement of Speech, “No” 
Means “No”, LEARNING NETWORK:  TEACHING & LEARNING WITH THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 
2011, 3:04 PM), http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/the-constitution-and-you-video-
games-and-the-first-amendment/?scp=1&sq=brown%20v.%20entertainment%20 
merchants%20association&st=cse (noting that the Court’s decisions in First Amendment cases 
often depart from the usual conservative/liberal dichotomy).   
110. See generally Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2742.  
111. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
112. Id. at 2742–51 (Alito, J., concurring). 
113. Id. at 2751–61 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2761–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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A.  Scalia’s Majority Opinion 
 The majority examined the Act not as a restriction on minors’ First 
Amendment rights, but as a restriction on an entirely new category of 
speech—violence.114  Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument that 
Ginsberg v. New York was the appropriate case precedent, stating instead 
that Stevens governed the outcome.115  Reiterating the reasoning of United 
States v. Stevens, the majority argued against creating a new category of 
unprotected speech simply because the legislature believes that certain 
speech harms society.116 Justice Scalia emphasized the absence of a history 
or tradition limiting children’s access to depictions of gore.117  He cited 
Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, Hansel and Gre-
tel, Homer’s Odyssey, Dante’s Inferno, and Lord of the Flies as examples 
of culturally endorsed, violence-rich content for children.118  Further, he 
dismissed the state’s argument that the “interactive” nature of video games 
was a unique attribute, stating that for decades, young readers have been 
able to make decisions that determine the plot lines in “choose-your-own-
adventure” novels “by following instructions about which page to turn.”119  
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Court applied strict scrutiny and decided that the 
statute failed to address a compelling state interest.120  The Court stated that 
the industry’s current system of voluntary regulation, the Entertainment 
Software Rating Board (“ESRB”), was sufficient to ensure that seriously 
violent games were kept out of the hands of children, and that any remain-
ing enforcement gap was not a compelling interest.121  The Court also 
found that the Act was not narrowly tailored, but was, instead, simultane-
ously underinclusive and overinclusive.122  The Act was underinclusive be-
cause it did not regulate other forms of violent media (for example, “Satur-
day morning cartoons”) in the face of psychological studies that have 
shown video games and other types of violent media produce similar ef-
fects.123  On the other hand, the Act was overinclusive because all children 
 
114. See id. at 2735.  
115. See id. at 2734.  
116. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (citing United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
1577, 1585 (2010)).     
117. Id. at 2736. 
118. Id. at 2736–37.   
119. Id. at 2737–38. 
120. Id. at 2741. 
121. Id.   
122. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42. 
123. Id. at  2739–40. 
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would be prohibited from buying the games covered by the Act, including 
children whose parents do not disapprove of the games.124 
B.  Alito’s Concurrence 
 Justice Alito’s concurrence argued that the Act failed on vagueness 
grounds.125  Alito stated that despite similarities in language and structure, 
the Act had departed from the Ginsberg statute in several key respects.126  
First, he said the Act’s threshold requirements, which limited the Act’s ap-
plicability exclusively to games where a player may “kill[], maim[], dis-
member[], or sexually assault[] an image of a human being,” did not fur-
nish sufficient notice to game manufacturers.127  Because similar violent 
depictions have long been regarded as suitable for the entertainment of mi-
nors, manufacturers may not be able to easily ascertain which violent de-
pictions would be encompassed by the Act.128 
 For the same reason, Alito found the Act’s three-prong test did not 
provide fair notice of what material would be covered.129  He stated that the 
Act’s use of the terms “deviant” and “morbid” required an assumption that 
there are “generally accepted standards regarding the suitability of violent 
entertainment for minors” and that such standards are well known.130  Alito 
emphasized that the long history of obscenity regulations, which helped to 
shape community standards about sexual content, was absent for violent 
content.131  Consequently, a state law regulating violent content could not 
be based on community norms.132 
 After invalidating the Act on vagueness grounds, Justice Alito re-
sponded to the majority opinion.133  Unlike the majority, Alito did not as-
sume that video games were the same as choose-your-own-adventure nov-
els.134  Alito noted a difference between passively reading a work of 
literature or watching television and actively killing video game charac-
 
124. Id. at 2741.    
125. Id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring).   
126. Id. at 2743 (Alito, J., concurring).   
127. Id. at 2745 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2009)).   
128. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2745 (Alito, J., concurring).   
129. Id. at 2746 (Alito, J., concurring). 
130. Id. at 2745 (Alito, J., concurring).  
131. Id. at 2746 (Alito, J., concurring).  
132. See id. at 2745–46 (Alito, J., concurring).   
133. See id. at 2746 (Alito, J., concurring). 
134. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2750 n.19 (Alito, J., concurring).   
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ters.135  He described several video games with antisocial themes that 
depicted extremely heinous violence,136 and cautioned that the majority was 
too quick to conclude that the interactive nature of video games does not 
distinguish them from other forms of media.137  Unlike the majority, he left 
open the possibility that some regulation of the sale of violent video games 
to children might be warranted.138 
 Alito also expressed concern that the Court’s opinion would be 
viewed by the video game industry as a declaration that government regula-
tion of minors’ access to violent games would never be permissible.139  He 
argued that the majority’s firm endorsement of violent games for children 
would dissolve the industry’s incentive to self-regulate since the ESRB was 
implemented largely to stave off government regulation.140 
C.  Thomas’s Dissent 
 Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that closely examined the 
original intent of the Constitution’s ratifiers with regard to the rights of 
children.141  While he acknowledged that Stevens prohibited the creation of 
new categorical exclusions, he noted that the Court had not foreclosed the 
possibility that there may be additional exclusions “that have been histori-
cally unprotected and . . . not yet identified . . . in our case law.”142  He 
 
135. See id. at 2750 (Alito, J., concurring).   
136. See id. at 2749–50 (Alito, J., concurring).  Alito recounts one game “in which a player 
can take on the identity and reenact the killings carried out by the perpetrators of the murders at 
Columbine High School and Virginia Tech.”  Id. at 2749 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Kayla 
Webley, “School Shooter” Video Game to Reenact Columbine, Virginia Tech Killings, 
TIME.COM (Apr. 20, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/04/20/school-shooter-video-game-
reenacts-columbine-virginia-tech-killings/).  He cites another game where the objective is “to 
rape a mother and her daughters . . . .”  Id. at 2749–50 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Kyung Lah, 
“RapeLay” Video Game Goes Viral Amid Outrage, CNN (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-30/world/japan.video.game.rape_1_game-teenage-girl-japanese-
government?_s=PM:WORLD).  In another game, “players engage in ‘ethnic cleansing’ and can 
choose to gun down African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews.”  Id. at 2750 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(citing Julia Scheeres, Games Elevate Hate to Next Level, WIRED (Feb. 20, 2002), 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/02/50523.  In yet another game, “players at-
tempt to fire a rifle shot into the head of President Kennedy as his motorcade passes by the Texas 
School Book Depository.”  Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2750 (Alito, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Clive Thompson, A View to a Kill:  JFK Reloaded Is Just Plain Creepy, SLATE (Nov. 22, 
2004), http://www.slate.com/id/2110034). 
137. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring). 
138. See id. at 2751 (Alito, J., concurring).   
139. See id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring).   
140. See id. at 2747–48 (Alito, J., concurring).   
141. See id. at 2751–61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
142. Id. at 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586).   
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concluded that the Founders did not intend for the “freedom of speech” to 
encompass a right to speak to children by bypassing their parents, or a right 
of children to access speech.143  Instead, the founding generation believed 
that speech must be closely regulated by a minor’s guardian,144 as the coun-
try’s newly free and democratic society necessitated that children were 
properly guided into virtuous citizens.145  The majority dismissed Thomas’s 
arguments for lack of legal support,146 but under his originalist interpretive 
methodology, the Act posed no constitutional problem and should have 
been upheld.147 
D.  Breyer’s Dissent 
 Like Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer argued that the Act should be up-
held.148  However, Breyer departed from Thomas’s originalist analysis and 
instead relied on precedents from Ginsberg and Prince v. Massachusetts.149  
Unlike the majority, Breyer did not dismiss Ginsberg as dealing exclusively 
with obscenity.150  He argued that the First Amendment does not apply to 
children in the same way that it applies to adults.151  Breyer furthermore be-
lieved that the issue before the Court was whether the State of California 
could regulate certain speech to protect children, not whether the Court 
should create a new categorical exclusion for depictions of violence.152 
 Breyer accepted that the Act, functioning as a content-based restric-
tion, must survive strict scrutiny.153  Relying on subsequent interpretations 
of Ginsberg, Breyer found that “protecting children from harm” had previ-
ously been recognized as a compelling government interest,154 and that the 
 
143. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2752 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
144. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
145. See id. at 2755 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
146. See id. at 2736 n.3.  
147. See id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
148. See id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
149. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2762  (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that the government may enforce child labor 
laws over religious exercise claims by Jehovah’s Witnesses whose children wish to participate in 
proselytizing and suggesting the standard of review for regulations of minors is lower than that 
for adults)).   
150. See id. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
151. See id. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
638 n.6 (1968)). 
152. See id. at 2762–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
153. See id. at 2765–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
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evidence that California offered was sufficient to prove that violent video 
games negatively affect children.155  He argued that, although experts de-
bate the conclusions of the scientific studies in the record, where conflict 
exists, the Court should defer to the conclusion of an elected legislature.156 
 Furthermore, Breyer found that the Act was narrowly tailored.157  Un-
like the majority, he argued that the enforcement gaps under the ESRB and 
the ineffectiveness of console filtering for tech-savvy teenagers was trou-
bling.158  Instead, a monetary penalty on vendors would be the most rea-
sonable means of preventing children’s access to violent games.159  Also, 
Breyer shared Justice Alito’s concern that the majority opinion would di-
minish the industry’s incentive to self-regulate.160 
 Like Justice Alito, Breyer compared the language of the statute in 
Ginsberg with the threshold requirements of the Act.161  In Breyer’s view, 
the Act did provide fair notice to game manufacturers of the content that 
would be forbidden for minors.162  He argued that the words “kill,” 
“maim,” and “dismember” are no less clear than the word “nudity”163 and 
that the remainder of the Act was virtually identical to the Miller test.164  
Similarly, he noted that the word “deviant” served the narrowing function 
of the Act no worse than the words “prurient” and “shameful.”165 
 Justice Breyer conceded that both the Miller test and the Ginsberg 
statute lack perfect clarity,166 but stated, “that fact reflects the difficulty of 
the Court’s long search for words capable of protecting expression without 
depriving the State of a legitimate constitutional power to regulate.”167  
Breyer also rejected Scalia’s survey of violence in classical literature as 
evidence of a cultural approval of violent content for children by emphasiz-
ing the diverse depictions of sex in other literary classics.168  Despite the 
 
155. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).   
156. See id. at 2769–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
157. See id. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874–79 
(1997)). 
158. See id. at 2770–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
159. See id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
160. See id. at 2770–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
161. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2763–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
162. Id. at 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
163. Id. at 2763–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
164. See id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
165. See id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
166. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
167. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
168. See id. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne can find in literature as many (if not 
more) descriptions of physical love as descriptions of violence.  Indeed, sex ‘has been a theme in 
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ubiquity of erotica in American culture, the Court has held that certain sex-
ual depictions are unprotected for minors and has had no difficulty deline-
ating erotic content that is protected for children from that which is not.169  
Based on this historical understanding, Breyer did not find a vagueness-
related difference between the Ginsberg statute and the Act.170  Breyer con-
cluded by saying that “the First Amendment does not disable government 
from helping parents make . . . a choice not to have their children buy ex-
tremely violent, interactive video games, which they more than reasonably 
fear pose only the risk of harm to those children.”171 
V.  JUSTICE BREYER IS RIGHT—THE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
 Stare decisis demands that the Supreme Court uphold California Civil 
Code sections 1746–1746.5 (“Act”).  Because the record is replete with 
evidence to support a conclusion that deviant, violent video games are 
more harmful to minors than other forms of violent media,172 the govern-
ment may act to protect the well being of children, a long established com-
pelling interest.173  Additionally, the statute is the least restrictive means to 
achieve this purpose because the industries’ proposed alternatives to gov-
ernment regulation, such as the Entertainment Software Ratings Board 
(“ESRB”) and parental controls on gaming systems, are insufficient.174  Fi-
nally, slight differences in the statutory language of the Act and other laws 
defining obscenity that the Court has upheld do not compel the conclusion 
that the Act is fatally vague.175 
A.  The Government Has a Compelling Interest in Protecting Children 
The Supreme Court has declared that, while minors have some con-
stitutional rights in common with adults, those rights “are not automati-
cally coextensive with the rights of adults.”176  As Justice Breyer sug-
 
art and literature throughout the ages.’  For every Homer, there is a Titian.  For every Dante, there 
is an Ovid.  And for all the teenagers who have read the original versions of Grimm’s Fairy Tales, 
I suspect there are those who know the story of Lady Godiva.”  (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002))).   
169. See id. at 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see generally Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646–47. 
170. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 2771.   
172. See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2771–79 app. (2011). 
173. See generally id.  
174. See id.  
175. See id. at 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
176. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citation omitted). 
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gested, the appropriate question in Entertainment Merchants Ass’n is not 
whether or not there is a historical tradition of regulating violent mate-
rial.177  The question instead is whether the state can regulate the sale of 
certain content to minors.178 
Case precedent, including Ginsberg v. New York, reveals that a state 
may regulate minors’ access to certain types of expressive content for their 
protection.179  According to precedent, there are two interests that warrant 
government intrusion into children’s First Amendment rights:  (1) aiding 
parents with their parental responsibilities and (2) the state’s independent 
interest in children’s well being.180 
1.  The Government’s Interest in Aiding Parents 
With the proliferation of electronic media, parents need more help from 
the state to monitor the media their children access.  When Ginsberg was de-
cided in 1968,181 children were not specifically targeted by the porn industry 
to buy pornographic magazines.182  Today, advertisements for violent video 
games frequently appear where children may see them.183  Also, since both 
parents often work outside the home, children today are more likely than 
those in 1968 to be unsupervised after school hours.184  Given these factors, it 
is reasonable to assume that parents need the government’s aid to help moni-
tor the video games their children play, and the Act only reinforces this pa-
 
177. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
178. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
179. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968). 
180. Id. 
181. See id.  
182. Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm:  Why Miller Should 
Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611, 642–43 (2008). 
183. See Killzone Ads Pulled from Canadian Bus Stops, GEEKOLOGIE (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.geekologie.com/2009/03/killzone_ads_pulled_from_canad.php (describing an inci-
dent where a teacher emailed Sony Canada after seeing an ad for Killzone 2 in the bus shelter 
near his school).  Also, as a relevant anecdote, a  particularly graphic advertisement for Grand 
Theft Auto III covered the side of midrise building in mid-city Los Angeles for several months in 
2009, and for several months in 2010 Los Angeles Metro buses displayed ads for Call of Duty:  
Black Ops, an M-rated violent video game.  See Call of Duty:  Black Ops, HILLARYCOE.COM, 
http://www.hillarycoe.com/812553/Call-of-Duty-Black-Ops (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
184. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today, 5.3 million 
grade-school-age children of working parents are routinely left home alone.” (citing Dept. of 
Commerce, Census Bureau, Who’s Minding the Kids?  Child Care Arrangements:  Spring 
2005/Summer 2006, p.12 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p70-
121.pdf)).   
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rental authority.  Conversely, parents who want their children to play violent 
games can simply purchase the games for their children themselves.185 
Justice Scalia found that the Act interfered with the rights of children 
whose parents or guardians “think violent video games are a harmless 
pastime.”186  However, the right of a child to access certain types of speech 
without parental consent is not a right deeply entrenched in history or tradi-
tion, nor ever recognized by the Court.187  Scalia dismissed completely the 
one fundamental right in Entertainment Merchants Ass’n that does stand on 
firm constitutional footing:188  the fundamental right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children.189  He did not agree that the Act aided in the 
discharge of parental authority and said that states should not regulate chil-
dren’s access to violent content “just in case their parents [may] disapprove 
of that speech.”190  However, this type of government regulation of chil-
dren’s access to speech is exactly what the Court upheld in Ginsberg and 
many other cases.191  In fact, the Court has upheld numerous broadcasting 
restrictions, which affect adults and children alike, all in the name of pro-
tecting children from speech of which their parents may disapprove.192 
2.  The State’s Independent Interest in the Well Being of Children 
 The majority did not even acknowledge the state’s “independent in-
terest in the well being of its youth.”193  However, as Justice Breyer pointed 
 
185. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1(c) (West 2011). 
186. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2742. 
187. See id. at 2760 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has never held, until today, that 
‘the freedom of speech’ includes a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) 
without going through the minors’ parents.”).  
188. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1979) (“[T]he guiding role of par-
ents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors” and “the 
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent  with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, 
the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
20, at 792 (stating that a fundamental right is one that the government may not abridge unless it 
meets the requirements of strict scrutiny).   
189. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2740.  
190. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2740. 
190. Id. 
191. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; see also, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 
539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Denver Area Educ. Tele-
comms. Consortium, Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115 (1989).  
192. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Denver Area Educ. Tele-
comms. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. 727; Info. Providers Coal. for Def. of the First Amendment v. 
FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).  
193. See generally Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2732–42. 
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out, the Court has previously stated that an immature and developing child 
may be less able than an adult to determine for him or herself what material 
is appropriate or not, and as such is vulnerable to “negative influences.”194  
Accordingly, the state has an interest in intervening to prevent such obsta-
cles to a child’s development into an upstanding citizen.195 
 Justice Scalia impliedly found that the Act did not implicate a state in-
terest in the well being of children because he concluded that violent video 
games pose no risk to children.196  He dismissed the state’s evidence dem-
onstrating the effects of violent video games because a direct causal link 
had not been proven.197  Justice Scalia stated that “[b]ecause [the State] 
bears the risk of uncertainty [when regulating speech based on content], 
ambiguous proof will not suffice” to survive strict scrutiny.198 
 Despite Justice Scalia’s contention that strict scrutiny applies,199 the 
traditional justification for strictly reviewing content-based restrictions—to 
prevent the government from extracting entire viewpoints or ideas from the 
public dialogue—does not manifest in this context.200  The Act would not 
remove any viewpoint or subject matter from the public dialogue, only 
from the hands of children whose parents did not buy the violent video 
games for them.201  Nevertheless, the Act would still survive even if the 
Court were to decide that a level of review higher than that applied in 
Ginsberg would be appropriate, such as an intermediate level of review or 
even strict scrutiny.  The evidence demonstrates a potential for risk to chil-
dren posed by deviant violent games,202 and protecting them from that risk 
is a compelling interest.203  
 By the time the Supreme Court heard the oral arguments in the case, 
there had been over 1,000 independent studies of violent video games that 
reached various conclusions.204  Although these studies did not definitely 
prove a direct causal link between violent videos games and harm to mi-
 
194. Id. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 
(2005)). 
195. See id. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
196. See id. at 2739. 
197. See id. at 2738–39. 
198. Id. at 2739. 
199. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring), 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
201. See CIV. § 1746.1(c). 
202. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2771–79 app.   
203. See id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
204. See id. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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nors, the Court has held that a “legislature can make a predictive judgment 
that such a link exists, based on competing psychological studies.”205  The 
Supreme Court has held that  “Congress is far better equipped than the ju-
diciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon . . . 
[such a] . . . complex and dynamic [issue] . . . .  And Congress is not 
obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an 
administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review.”206  
Accordingly, the California legislature was entitled to rely on this evidence 
in passing the Act. 
 Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer examined both the studies in the 
record and outside studies and found that even though a definitive consen-
sus had not been reached, the leading professional pediatric and psychiatric 
organizations had declared a relationship, some even a causal relationship, 
between violent video games and negative behavioral and cognitive effects 
in children.207  Justice Breyer conceded that since the Court lacked the ex-
pertise necessary to definitively decide which studies were accurate, it 
should defer to the legislature’s judgment.208 
 While the Court in Ginsberg did not require a single shred of evi-
dence to restrict minors’ access to pornographic material,209 the Court in 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n has mandated that the California legisla-
ture prove causation, a virtually impossible evidentiary standard,210 in order 
to regulate the sale of violent games to children.211  This extraordinarily 
heavy evidentiary burden is not only contradictory to the Court’s opinion in 
 
205. Id. at 2738 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)). 
206. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 665–66 (citing Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985)). 
207. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing American 
Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, the American 
Medical Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians, the American Psychiatric 
Association, and the American Psychological Association).  
208. Id. at 2770 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[W]e 
should not hastily dismiss the judgment of legislators, who may be in a better position than we 
are to assess the implications of new technology.  The opinion of the Court exhibits none of this 
caution.”).   
209. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 (stating legislatures do not need to show scientific evi-
dence). 
210. What is the difference between causation and correlation?, STATS.ORG, 
http://stats.org/in_depth/faq/causation_correlation.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (“In general, it 
is extremely difficult to establish causality between two correlated events or observances.  In con-
trast, there are many statistical tools to establish a statistically significant correlation.”); see also 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring) (acknowledging that proving a 
causal link is a “formidable (and perhaps insurmountable) obstacle”).     
211. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Ginsberg, but also represents a departure from other case precedents.212  
Typically, the Court will grant at least some measure of deference to the 
legislature when there is conflicting scientific evidence in an area requiring 
particular expertise.213 
Thus, the double standard in the evidentiary burden required to regulate 
minors’ exposure to violent content and to erotic materials has created what 
Justice Breyer referred to as “a serious anomaly in First Amendment law.”214 
 He asked: 
[W]hat sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy 
a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a 
sale to that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in which he 
actively, but virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures 
and kills her?  . . . . 
 This anomaly is not compelled by the First Amendment.  It 
disappears once one recognizes that extreme violence, where in-
teractive, and without literary, artistic, or similar justification, 
can prove at least as, if not more, harmful to children as photo-
graphs of nudity.215 
 In the context of this case, the state had two compelling interests—
facilitating the parental role and protecting the well being of children.216  
Both interests are firmly established in case precedent such that the gov-
 
212. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997); Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 330 n.12; Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 n.13, 370 (1983); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 
427 (1974); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 
297–98 (1912); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30–31 (1905). 
213. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (hold-
ing in a First Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance that the city of Renton was not re-
quired to present evidence of alleged “secondary effects” of adult theaters in its own city, but in-
stead could rely on studies conducted by other cities, as long as the evidence was reasonably 
relevant to the city’s objectives); see Marshall, 414 U.S. at 427 (“When Congress undertakes to 
act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be espe-
cially broad.”); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163–64 (deferring to legislative judgment of the 
necessity of a particular method of abortion and stating that “[t]he Court has given state and fed-
eral legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific 
uncertainty[;] . . .  [m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the 
abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.”).  
214. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at  2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
215. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
216. Id. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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ernment may regulate minors’ access to violent video games to further 
those interests.217 
B.  The Act is Narrowly Tailored 
 The Act does not “burden more speech than necessary” to achieve the 
government’s objective.218  It functions in the same way as many other 
statutes enacted to protect children.219  It punishes only the sale of certain 
violent video games to children—not the possession (by children or adults) 
of such games.220  Even in the First Amendment context, similar statutes 
have been upheld as narrowly tailored.221 
 The majority stated that the Act was not narrowly tailored, but was 
both underinclusive and overinclusive.222  Justice Scalia held the Act was 
overinclusive because all children would be prohibited from buying the 
games covered by the Act, not only those whose parents did not want them 
to have the games.223  While the Court has repeatedly recognized an inter-
est in aiding parental authority,224 it has never recognized the right of a 
child to bypass that authority in order to access speech.225  Accordingly, 
this feature of the Act does not make it “overinclusive.”  The majority held 
the Act is underinclusive because it regulated only video games and not 
other forms of violent media.226  Despite Justice Scalia’s claim that the ef-
fects of violent video games on children are small and indistinguishable 
 
217. Id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. 
218. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2011); see also Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (stating that a content neutral injunction should be evaluated by 
asking “whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest”). 
219. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West 2008) (prohibiting the sale or furnishing of 
tobacco or smoking paraphernalia to minors); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12280(a)(2) (West 2009) 
(prohibiting the transfer, lending, sale, of furnishing of any assault weapon to a minor); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 30300(a)(1) (West 2011) (prohibiting the sale or supply of ammunition to a per-
son under 18); CAL. PENAL CODe §§ 313–313.1 (West 2008) (prohibiting the sale, rental or dis-
tribution of pornography to minors).  
220. See CIV. § 1746.1(a), (c).  
221. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631–33 (affirming the lower court’s decision that a 
statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors under the age of seventeen is constitu-
tional). 
222. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42. 
223. Id. 
224. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–66 (1944); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 
639–40. 
225. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2760 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
226. Id. at 2742.  
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from other forms of violent media,227 evidence suggests that violent video 
games do have a greater affect on children than other forms of violent me-
dia.228  Accordingly, the Court would be justified in creating another nar-
row carve-out, much like that created in Ginsberg,229 which regulates only 
the sale of interactive violent media. 
C.  There Is No Less Restrictive Alternative 
 Precedent holds that a legislature may regulate protected speech when 
children are involved and if the means chosen are the least restrictive.230  
Studies show that the ESRB has fallen short in limiting children’s access to 
deviant violent video games and that government intervention is needed.231  
Like the ESRB, parental controls are an insufficient alternative because 
technologically savvy children can run a Google search and learn how to 
bypass them.232  Only a monetary penalty would truly incentivize the indus-
 
227. Id. at 2739. 
228. See id. at 2768–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing examples of studies that show 
how the effects of video games are different from traditional passive media forms) (citing Brad J. 
Bushman & Rowell Huesmann, Aggression, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 851 (S.T. 
Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010) (stating that video games stimulate more aggression because 
“‘[p]eople learn better when they are actively involved,’ players are ‘more likely to identify with 
violent characters,’ and ‘violent games directly reward violent behavior.’”); Hanneke Polman, 
Bram Orobio de Castro, & Marcel A.G. van Aken, Experimental Study of the Differential Effects 
of Playing Versus Watching Violent Video Games on Children’s Aggressive Behavior, in 34 
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 256–64 (2008) (“[F]inding greater aggression resulting from playing, as 
opposed to watching” violent game); Craig A. Anderson, Douglas A. Gentile, & Katherine E. 
Buckley, VIOLENT VIDEO GAME EFFECTS ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS:  THEORY, 
RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 136–37 (2007) (citing three studies finding greater effects from 
games as opposed to television)); see also Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (stating that 
statements of expert public health associations agree that interactive games can be more harmful 
than “passive media” like television). 
229. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at. 636–38.  
230. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126 (“[T]he Government may . . . regulate the 
content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses 
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”)  
231. See Cohen, supra note 69; see also FTC, A REPORT TO CONGRESS, MARKETING 
VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN:  A FIFTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY 
PRACTICES IN THE MOTION  PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES 19 
(Apr. 2007), available at  http://www.ftc.gov/reports 
/violence/070412MarketingViolentEChildren.pdf (reporting that a survey by the National Insti-
tute on Media and the Family found that seven of ten of the 600 children surveyed reported play-
ing M-rated games, and sixty-one percent owned an M-rated game) (citations omitted). 
232. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2770 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
hockey14822, How to Bypass Parental Controls on the Xbox 360, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFIVfVmvN6k (type “how to bypass parental controls on 
Xbox 360” in the search box on youtube.com, click search, then select the first link shown). 
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try to refrain from selling the objectionable content to minors.  In dicta, Jus-
tice Brennan stated in Ginsberg that society’s interest in protecting children 
justifies any “reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them.”233  The 
Act is not only “reasonable,” but it is also the “least restrictive” means. 
D.  The Act is Not Vague 
The Act is based upon the Miller framework, some variation of which 
the Court has endorsed for over fifty years.234  The only substantive 
difference between the Miller test and the Act is that the Act replaces the 
word “prurient” with the words “deviant or morbid,” and the threshold re-
quirements are directed towards depictions of “killing and maiming” rather 
than hardcore sex.235  Justice Alito claimed that these differences made the 
Act fatally vague.236  He argued that a long history of obscenity prohibition 
has shaped community norms to provide meaning to the phrase “patently 
offensive” with regard to sexually expressive material.237  He found that 
because there was no similar regulation of violent content, there is a total 
lack of consensus about what violent content would be considered “low-
value” by community standards.238 
Difficulty in defining “‘accepted norms’ about depictions of sex” led 
the Court to adopt the “community standards” tool in the first place.239  In 
Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that many of the Court’s 
decisions acknowledge that the terms defining obscenity are not precise.240 
Furthermore, the Court stated that imprecise statutory terms alone do 
not violate due process; instead, “all that is required is that the language 
‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and practices . . . .’”241 
Whether or not there is a cultural endorsement of violent content for 
children, the word “prurient”242 is not somehow empowered with greater 
 
233. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (citing People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1965)). 
234. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); A Book Named “John Cle-
land’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  
235. Compare CIV. § 1746(d)(1), with Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.  
236. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2744–46 (Alito, J., concurring).   
237. Id. at 2744 (Alito, J., concurring).   
238. Id. at 2746 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Edwards & Berman, Regulating Violence on 
Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487, 1523 (1995)).  
239. Id. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
240. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 491.  
241. Id. (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1947)).  
242. See Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 646–47. 
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capabilities of precision than the words “deviant” or “morbid.”243  Commu-
nity standards operate identically in both instances to delineate what ex-
pressive sexual material is and is not obscene and what violent depictions 
are or are not appropriate for children.244  As Justice Breyer pointed out, 
even games depicting the most heinous violence will still be protected, as 
long as they possess at least one of the redeeming attributes described in 
the third prong.245  For games lacking any value whatsoever, a community 
could reach a consensus about which of those games were appropriate for 
children just as easily as it could reach a consensus about what hardcore 
sexual content was patently offensive to adults.246  Accordingly, the Act’s 
definition gives fair notice to video game manufacturers.247 
VI.  THE ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION DID NOT HAVE 
STANDING TO ASSERT THE RIGHT AT STAKE 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n should not have been heard 
in a United States court because the Entertainment Merchants Association 
(“EMA”) lacked standing to assert the rights of third parties not before the 
Court.  In Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, no child appeared before the 
Court, yet the Court ruled that California Civil Code sections 1746–1746.5 
(“Act”) were unconstitutional “because [the Act] abridges the First 
Amendment rights of young people . . . .”248  The Act specifically provided 
that a parent or guardian could purchase the games for their child.249  With 
this understanding, the only right at issue is the right of a minor to purchase 
violent video games without parental consent.  As Justice Thomas pointed 
out, no similar right of a child to circumvent parental authority in this man-
ner has ever been recognized as a constitutional right.250 
 
243. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2763–64  (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
245. Id. (stating that the third prongs of the Miller test and of the Act consider whether the 
work, when taken as a whole, is utterly without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value).   
246. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (noting that when evaluating obscenity, the court balances inter alia whether the mate-
rial offends contemporary community standards). 
247. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
248. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).   
249. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1(c) (West 2011). 
250. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2760 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has 
never held, until today, that ‘the freedom of speech’ includes a right to speak to minors (or a right 
of minors to access speech) without going through the minors’ parents.”). 
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 None of the four opinions in the case addressed the issue of stand-
ing.251  However, if the Court had conducted a standing analysis, it would 
have reached the conclusion that the EMA did not have standing in this 
case.  Assuming arguendo, that there is a constitutional right to be free 
from parental control and that it is a right that could be pursued on jus tertii 
standing, the EMA still does not meet the requirements for jus tertii stand-
ing to assert this right on behalf of its child customers.  Consequently, the 
Court based its ruling on the First Amendment rights of a party not before 
the Court. 
Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to “cases or 
controversies” where (1) the plaintiff has suffered or imminently will suffer 
an injury; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant; and 
(3) a court is able to redress the plaintiff’s alleged injury.252  In addition to 
these restrictions, courts may also employ the doctrine of standing as a pru-
dential restraint when deciding whether or not to hear a case.253  Generally, 
a plaintiff must assert his or her own rights in a matter in order to have 
standing.254  On occasion, courts will make exceptions to the standing re-
quirement and allow jus tertii standing, where third parties assert the rights 
of others if certain conditions are satisfied.255  The Court considers three 
primary factors in granting jus tertii standing:  (1) whether or not there is 
an injury in fact to a party; (2) whether or not a close relationship exists be-
tween the litigant and the third party; and (3) whether some obstacle im-
pedes the third party from asserting his or her own rights in the matter.256   
In Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the EMA did satisfy the Article III 
requirements for standing to assert their own rights since the Act’s financial 
penalty would have been imposed on them.257  However, the Court did not 
base its ruling on the rights of the EMA but instead, impliedly conferred 
upon them jus tertii standing to assert the rights of minors.258  However, the 
potential for injury arising from the financial penalty would have provided 
 
251. See generally id.  
252. See, e.g., Ne. Fl. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663–64 (1993).   
253. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 50 n.1.   
254. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).  
255. Robert Allen Sedler, Comment, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Su-
preme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1962).  
256. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989); Campbell 
v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 396–400 (1998) (determining that a white defendant has standing to 
assert the equal protection rights of African Americans who were excluded from jury service).   
257. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.3 (West 2011). 
258. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. at 2742  (ruling the Act unconstitutional “because it 
abridges the First Amendment rights of young people,” not because of any possible violation of 
the Video Dealers’ rights to manufacture or sell video games).  
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a basis for the EMA to meet the first jus tertii requirement of an “injury in 
fact.”  But, EMA is unable to meet the second and third requirements of jus 
tertii standing. 
 Based on the facts of the case, there was no “close relationship” be-
tween the EMA and the children whose First Amendment rights they as-
sert.259  The only possible basis for any relationship between the litigant 
and the third party would be that of a vendor/vendee relationship.260  The 
Court has recognized that vendors may have standing to challenge acts that 
regulate buyers or the relationship of buyers and sellers.261  While the Court 
has generally been inconsistent in allowing or disallowing third party 
standing for minors,262 the Court had never allowed a vendor to assert the 
standing of children customers until Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.263  
The closest precedent for such a decision would be Craig v. Boren.264 
 In Craig, the Court allowed an alcohol vendor to have jus tertii stand-
ing to assert the Fourteenth Amendment rights of men between the ages of 
18 and 21 who challenged the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting 
the sale of beer to males under age 21 and females under age 18.265  The pe-
titioner was under 21 at the time the suit was filed, but since he was over 21 
at the time the Court heard the case, the Court found his standing was 
moot.266  Because the defendant in Craig waived the jus tertii issue, the 
Court’s standing analysis does not provide precedent for future cases.267  
 
259. See generally Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. 2729; see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U.S. 106, 115 (1976) (explaining that the litigant and third party must have the same 
or parallel interests to establish a “close relationship”). 
260. See generally Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. 2729; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3, at 742 (Richard D. Freer & Edward H. 
Cooper eds., 3d ed.) (“Vendors are routinely accorded standing to assert the constitutional rights 
of customers and prospective customers.”). 
261. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 
431 U.S. 678, 683–84 (1977) (conferring standing on the basis of the sensitive nature of the right 
at stake (personal privacy with regard to reproductive health) in addition to the vendor/vendee 
relationship).  
262. Compare Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (denying a fa-
ther standing on behalf of his daughter to challenge the addition of the words “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance as violating the Establishment Clause), with Planned Parenthood of N. New 
Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004) (allowing a physician and three health centers to have 
standing to assert the rights of minors to challenge a statute requiring parental notification in or-
der for a minor to obtain an abortion).    
263. The Court did not address the issue of standing in Ginsberg.  See generally Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
264. Craig, 429 U.S. 190. 
265. Id. at 192–93.   
266. Id. at 192.   
267. Id. at 193. 
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Nevertheless, it allowed the case to proceed on the vendor’s claim of jus ter-
tii standing, in part because the men affected by the law would not be able to 
challenge the law because they would be “of age” by the time a final deci-
sion was reached, making the constitutional violation capable of repeat, yet 
evading judicial review.268  Since the petitioners’ standing would always be 
moot by the time the final decision was reached, the Court decided instead 
to confer standing upon the vendor to avoid repetitive and time-consuming 
litigation.269 
 Had the standing issue not been waived in Craig, it may have pro-
vided sound precedent to confer standing in this case, except for one key 
difference—the petitioners in Craig were not minors.270  While the 
relationship between a customer and vendor may be sufficiently close in 
some instances, the Court has never allowed a vendor to assert the rights of 
children against their parents, or even the rights of children as their own, 
without any alternative basis for finding a “close relationship.”271  Jus tertii 
standing to assert the rights of children requires a particularly close rela-
tionship and has been recognized for parents,272 schools and teachers,273 
and medical providers,274 but not vendors. 
 Because the Court has allowed parents to assert standing on behalf of 
their children when the state attempts to interfere with the parent/child rela-
tionship,275 better precedent for Entertainment Merchants Ass’n would be 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.276  In Society of Sisters, a parochial school was 
allowed third-party standing to assert the rights of parents to challenge a 
compulsory public school attendance law.277  The petitioners alleged that 
the law abridged the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their chil-
 
268. Id. at 193–94.   
269. Id. 
270. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192. 
271. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (conferring standing not solely on 
basis of the vendor/vendee relationship, but also because Baird was a medical provider and “an 
advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives”). 
272. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
840–42 (1977).  
273. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 638 F.2d 858, 863 
(1982).  
274. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 390 F.3d 53; Population Servs. Int’l., 
431 U.S. 678.  
275. See, e.g., Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 840–42 (hold-
ing foster parents could not only raise their own rights, but could also raise the rights of their fos-
ter children).  
276. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  
277. Id. at 519.   
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dren.278  The Court agreed and ruled that the statute created an unreason-
able interference with constitutionally recognized parental rights.279  By al-
lowing the EMA to assert the rights of children against their parents, the 
Supreme Court essentially holds that the vendor/vendee relationship trumps 
the parent/child relationship.280 
 The Court has also ruled that where a child’s parents fail to fulfill 
their parental role for whatever reason, the child is subject to the control of 
the state as parens patriae.281  Based on this precedent, if anyone appearing 
before the Court in Entertainment Merchants Ass’n had a relationship with 
the third party sufficient to confer jus tertii standing, it would have been the 
State.  Contrarily, the EMA has a purely economic interest that has nothing 
to do with the well being of children, and which may even present a con-
flict of interest.  Accordingly, the Court should have denied the EMA jus 
tertii standing and the case should not have been heard. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 Given the Court’s full endorsement of violent content for minors, the 
concomitant anomaly it has created in minors’ First Amendment jurispru-
dence was not lost on Justices Alito and Roberts,282 or Justice Breyer,283 
and it was certainly not lost on Jon Stewart either.  Following the Court’s 
decision, he played a clip on The Daily Show from the game Mortal Kom-
bat that showed two men holding a woman by each of her legs and slowly 
ripping her in half from her groin through the top of her skull—blood and 
organs pouring out of her chest and abdominal cavities onto the floor.284  
He gibed satirically at the audience:  “The Supreme Court has ruled 7-2 
that the state of California has no interest in restricting the sale of this game 
to children.  But, if while being disemboweled, this woman were to suffer, 
perhaps, a nip-slip . . . regulate away!”285 
 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 534–35. 
280. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. at 2742.  
281. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[The] rights of parent-
hood [are not] beyond limitation.”); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (stating that the 
state may act to guard its independent interest in the well being of children).  
282. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2747 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).   
283. Id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
284. The Daily Show With Jon Stewart:  Episode #16086 (Comedy Central television 
broadcast June 30, 2011), available at http://gamepolitics.com/2011/07/01/daily-show-takes-
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 Given the 5-4 split of the Court on the ultimate issue of the state’s 
ability to regulate the sale of violent content for children, a subsequent 
challenge to a more narrowly crafted statute, supported by stronger evi-
dence of a causative relationship between violent video games and negative 
cognitive and behavioral effects on children, might win a majority of the 
Court’s support. 
